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1. Introduction: Dove’s argument scheme ‘appeal to visual model’ and the aim of this paper
Ian Dove (in his paper “On Appeals to (Visual) Models”) has developed a nice, concise and very
helpful theory of an argument scheme called “Appeal to Visual Model”. It captures how we can
(and sometimes do) reason from an observation on a visual model to a thesis about
corresponding features in reality. The theory is deliberately (Dove, 2016, p. 1) developed in the
style of Walton’s “argumentation schemes” (e.g. Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008; Walton, 1996)
and provides, like Walton, a somewhat formal but altogether rather contentual argument scheme
together with critical questions regarding critical points of the argument.
Dove’s (2016) theory is a clear progress because such an analysis of arguments on the
basis of visual models so long did not exist, because his analysis makes explicit inferential
relations which in the usual talk on visual arguments are not analyzed (p. 8) and thus brings us
nearer to an understanding of the rationality behind this reasoning, and because he underpins his
analysis with some theory on modelling in general. In particular I appreciate Dove’s effort and
endeavour to make explicit as far as possible what goes on in this kind of reasoning for being
able to assess it analytically (p. 6). On the other hand, I am critical with respect to Walton’s
argumentation schemes approach (see Lumer, 2016). Walton has introduced this approach to
resolve the problem of uncertain, i.e., non-deductive arguments (Walton et al., 2008). Some of
my main worries with this approach are: It does not provide any underlying theory, no
epistemological basis of the schemes, so that it remains unclear why we should believe in the
conclusion after having accepted the premisses and having received satisfying answers to our
critical questions. Existing inferential relations are not revealed or made explicit. There are no
clear criteria for assessing individual arguments with the help of the schemes. There is a
confusingly long list of not systematized contentual schemes, which should be reduced to
underlying formal argument types. The critical questions sometimes may focus our attention to
particularly critical points of the argument, but often they only question the truth of some
premise, and they do not help at all to resolve the problem of argumentative validity. The
conclusion does not contain any qualifier which captures its degree of uncertainty. Etc.
I think these problems can be resolved only by an espistemological approach to
argumentation. Furthermore, Dove’s analysis of appeals to visual models already have brought
us rather near to an epistemological analysis of this type of argument. Therefore, in what follows
I will procede this way. First, I will expose an analysis of appeals to visual models on the basis of
the epistemological approach to argumentation, thereby using Dove’s very instructive examples.
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Subsequently I will compare Dove’s Waltonian theory of the appeal to visual models with this
epistemological analysis and in doing so assess the relative advantages of both approaches.
2. An epistemological analysis of appeals to visual models
Dove provides two extensive examples of appeals to visual models. The first is a reasoning about
the quickest route from the present position to a nearby pub. There are three proposals of routes
which on the one hand differ in length but on the other may be quicker in spite of exceeding
length because of avoiding time-consuming obstacles, namely crossing slow intersections, since
the route passes less intersections or / and some intersections are provided with pedestrian
bridges. As the situation is somewhat confusing the persons involved consult a map from which
the distances can be read, the intersections can be counted and the footbridges individuated. With
the help of this information the quickest route is determined. The second example regards an xray on which the doctor individuates a bright line in the representation of a bone and infers from
this that the respective bone has a hairline fracture.
The map and the x-ray respectively are, of course, the models which represent aspects of
some part of the original: the town and the bone. And the features read from the model or, more
precisely, observed in the model and then possibly formulated as ‘this route (on the map) is about
10 cm long’ or ‘here is a bright line within the representation of the bone’ etc. are used to infer on
corresponding features of the original reality, i.e. the length of the real route and the fracture
respectively. This inference is made possible because of the isomorphy between the original and
the model. What is an isomorphy? An isomorphy is a relation which holds between two
structures, A and B, each of which consist of a set of objects, a° and b°, and a set of relations, F°
and G°, holding between them. Such structures A and B are isomorphic if two conditions are
fulfilled: 1. Bijective mapping: There is a bijective (or one-to-one) mapping  between the
objects of A and the objects of B as well as between the relations holding in A and the relations
holding in B; i.e., to every object ai of A exactly one object bi of B is assigned, and vice versa;
and to every relation Fi in A exactly one relation Gi in B is assigned, and vice versa. 2.
Homomorphism: If a relation Fi between the objects a1, …, an (Fi(a1, …, an)) holds in A the
corresponding relation Gi between the corresponding objects b1, …, bn in B holds as well, and
vice versa.
(A somewhat more formal definition of ‘isomorphy’ is this:
Formal definition of ‘isomorphic’:
Two structures A (A = (a°; F°) ) and B (B = (b°; G°) ), consisting of the sets a°
and b° of objects (a° = {a1, a2, ..., an}; b° (= {b1, b2, ..., bn}) and appertaining sets
F° and G° of relations (F° = {F1, F2, ..., Fm}; G° = {G1, G2, ..., Gm} holding with
respect to these objects, are isomorphic iff:
There is image function  between A und B, for which holds:
1.  ist bijective, i.e.: 1.1.  is a one-one mapping between the sets of objcetcs a°
and b° of A and B [which thus assigns to each ai from a° exactly one element bj of
b° and vice versa (so for all ai and bj holds: (ai)=bj and (bj)=ai)]; and 1.2.  is
a one-one mapping between the sets F° und G° of functions of A und B [which
thus assigns to every relation Fi one-to-one a relation Gj (with the same number of
places (i.e. for all Fi and Gj holds: (Fi)=Gj and (Gj)=Fi)]. And
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2.  ist homomorph, i.e.: a1, ..., an Fi: (Fi(a1, ..., an))  (Fi)((a1), ..., (an))
[i.e. if a relation Fi holds between some objects a1, …, an of A the corresponding
relation of B (i.e. Gi) must hold between the corresponding objects of a1, …, an
(i.e b1, …, bn), and vice versa].)
If we regard e.g., city maps, the original structure A is the city and the map is the model
B. If the map is of the North-American style the bijective relation, with respect to objects,
regards, among others, in reality: streets, geodetic positions, measures of angles as well as
measures of distances and on the the map: black lines, positions on the map (expressible in
coordinates) again measures of angles as well as measures of distances (cf. table 1). The bijective
relation between these two sets of objects is defined: for the streets, via writing street names next
to the respective lines on the map; for the geodetic position by orienting the map such that north
is up, sometimes by a grid of latitudinal and longitudinal lines but for city-maps mostly only by
writing the city’s name on the map; for the measures of angles the assignment is not made
explicit but it is the identity relation, so that to an angle of 40° in reality also 40° on the map are
assigned; and for the measures of distances the assignment is made via the scale written
somewhere on the map, such that for a 1:10,000 scale e.g., to 1 km in reality are assigned 10 cm
on the map. (More differentiated maps represent much more types of objects: kinds of streets,
buildings, parks, forests, meadows, railway lines etc.; and the bijective attribution, with respect
to the type of objects, is defined in the explanation of symbols, e.g., national roads are
represented by yellow lines with black borders.) The bijective assignment of relations for city
maps regards, primarily, geodetic position of objects in reality and position of symbols in the
coordinate system of the map and, secondarily, among others lengths of objects as well as angles
of boundaries of objects in reality and extensions of symbols as well as angles of intersecting or
touching lines on the map. Because these assignments of relations are intuitive, usually they are
not made explicit. Homomorphism then is reached by designing a precise map such that all
objects of the kind of objects which the map promises to represent are represented on the map by
the respective symbols and that these symbols are at the “right” place on the map.
The isomorphic relation of models to reality should be clearly defined, which implies that
the bijective mapping is restricted to clearly defined sets of objects and relations. This means,
negatively, that if the model is not a (exact) copy certain kinds of objects and many relations are
not represented in the model. It is characteristic of models that the isomorphy between the reality
and the model is intentionally and (hopefully) precisely created, either in single steps, manually
so to speak—as it is the case of maps or schemata of other things like parental relations,
genealogical trees of species, curves of population growth—or mechanically by respective
devices—as e.g., with photographs, x-rays, electrocardiograms, automatically created
temperature or humidity curves. This implies that models, as far as they are precise and as far as
the isomorphy (the bijective relation) goes, can serve as a more or less certain basis for
inferences on the represented reality. Within the respective argument—at least in its ideal
completely explicit form—then a proposition on the general isomorphy relation between the
respective part of reality and the model will be the major premise. And the truth of this premise
is guaranteed by the creator of the model, on whose sincerity and preciseness the arguer relies.
Since ismorphism is a strong relation this premise, together with premisses on the bijective
relations and on observations regarding specific features of the model, allows deductive
inferences to strong conclusions about reality.
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Table 1: Isomorphy of a city and a city map:
Reality: city
1.1. Objects
streets
geodetic position

Model: city map

measures of angles
distances
1.2. Relations
geodetic position of objects (‘x
is at position y’)
lenght of an object (‘x is y
meters long’)
angles of boundaries of objects
(‘the touching boundaries of
object x and of object y stand
with the angle z to each other’)
2. Homomorphism
Baker St is 1 km long.

measures of angles
distances

black lines
position
on
coordinates

(Way of) bijective assignment

the

street names on the map
map, north up, grid of latitudinal and
longitudinal lines, city name
on the map
identity relation (implicit)
scale written on the map

positions of symbols on the intuitive, not made explicit
map (‘x is at position y’)
length of objects on the map intuitive, not made explicit
(‘x is y cm long’)
angles of intersecting or intuitive, not made explicit
touching lines (‘line x and line
y stand with the angle z to each
other’)

The black line with the name
“Baker St” aside is 10 cm
long.
Baker St and Cesar St intersect The black line with the name
with a right angle.
“Baker St” aside and the black
line with the name “Cesar St”
aside intersect with a right
angle.
Let us make this idea more precise. What premisses do we need for an ideal, i.e., fully
explicit and argumentatively valid, appeal to (visual) models? First, we need as the major
premise a proposition on the isomorphic relation between the model and reality, then the premise
reporting the observation on the model. For making the inference to the corresponding feature of
reality deductively valid we next need premisses saying that the observed feature is part of the
model structure—and not e.g., a stain or advertising on the map—and premisses about the
bijective correspondences between the observed objects of the model and the represented objects
as well as between the observed kind of relation and the represented relation. Finally, for being
able to deductively exploit the isomorphy premise we need the isomorphy definition as kind of
(analytically true) connecting premise. Together, this is sufficient to then infer to the conclusion
about the feature of reality represented by what has been observed on the model. Alltogether we
thus get the following argument scheme:
Argument scheme ‘appeal to a (visual) model’:
Pi0: Isomorphy Definition: See above.
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Pi1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: Structure B (with the set b° of objects
and the set G° of relations) is a model of the real structure A (with the set a° of
objects and the set F° of relations) such that between B and A the isomorphy
relation  holds.
Pi2: Model Affiliation: The objects b1, …, bn are elements of the set of objects
(b°) of the model (B); the relation G is element of the set of representing relations
G° of the model (B).
Pi3: Observation on the Model: Between the objects b1, …, bn the relation G holds.
Pi4: Object Correspondences: The counterpart of b1 (defined by the isomorphy
function ) in reality A is a1; …; the counterpart of bn (defined by the isomorphy
function ) in reality is an.
Pi5: Relation Correspondence: The counterpart of the relation G (defined by the
isomorphy function ) in reality is the relation F.
Ci: Conclusion: Reality Statement: Between the real objects a1, …, an the relation
F holds.
(A somewhat more formal scheme is:
Formal argument scheme ‘appeal to a (visual) model’:
Pf0: Isomorphy Definition: See above.
Pf1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: The structure B (b°; G°) is a correct
model of the real structure A (a°; F°), such that between B and A the isomorphy
relation  holds.
Pf2: Model Affiliation: b1, …, bn  b°; G  G°.
Pf3: Observation on the Model: G(b1, …, bn).
Pf4: Object Correspondences: (b1) = a1; …; (bn) = an.
Pf5: Relation Correspondence: (G) = F.
Cf: Conclusion: Reality Statement: F(a1, …, an). )
Taking up Dove’s first extended example, an ideal, fully explicit appeal to a visual model
would be this:
Example of an ideal appeal to visual model:
Pe0: Isomorphy Definition: See above.
Pe1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: Map B is a model of the street
structure of city A in the sense that between B and A holds the isomorphy relation
 (in the North-American style of city maps: streets are represented by black
lines, …; the scale is 1:10,000 …).
Pe2: Model Affiliation: The black lines on the map labeled “Admiral St”, “Baker
St”, “Cesar St”, “Dundas St”, “Elvis St” and “Fitzgerald St” as well as the lines
between them and the distance of 10 cm are part of the model (i.e., they are part of
the representing features of the map).
Pe3: Observation on the Model: The (shortest) connection of lines from the
intersection of the lines labeled “Admiral St” and “Baker St” to the intersection of
the lines labeled “Cesar St” and “Dundas St” which includes / passes the
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intersection of the lines labeled “Elvis St” and “Fitzgerald St” (on the map B) is
10 cm long.
Pe4: Object Correspondences: The real counterpart of the intersection of the lines
labeled “Admiral St” and “Baker St” on the map is the crossroads Admiral St /
Baker St (where we are now). The real counterpart of the intersection of the lines
labeled “Cesar St” and “Dundas St” is the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St (where
the pub is). The real counterpart of the intersection of the lines labeled “Elvis St”
and “Fitzgerald St” is the crossroads Elvis St / Fitzgerald St. The real counterpart
of the black lines connecting these three points on the map are the streets
connecting the three crossroads. The real counterpart of a distance of 10 cm on the
map is 1 km.
Pe5: Relation Correspondence: The real counterpart of the relation ‘distance’ on
the map is (again) the distance.
Ce: Conclusion: Reality Statement: The (shortest) route from the crossroads
Admiral St / Baker St (where we are now) to the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St
(where the pub is) which passes the crossroads Elvis St / Fitzgerald St is 1 km
long.
The inference made in this argument is deductively valid. (And it is analytically valid if we leave
out the analytically true definition of ‘isomorphic’.) The advantage of this extended, ideal
version of the argument is to make the inferential validity clear. Its disadvantage is, of course,
that it is long and laborious. The latter problem is resolved by an enthymematic and otherwise
simplified version of this argument, which leaves out the isomorophy definition, the Model
Affiliation premise, several of the Correspondence premisses and simplifies some formulations.
The result could be this:
Ps1: Representation Relation / Isomorphy: B is a map of city A (with the scale
1:10,000).
Ps3: Observation on the Model: On the map the route from the crossroads
Admiral St / Baker St to the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St via the crossroads
Elvis St / Fitzgerald St is 10 cm long.
Ps4: Object Correspondence: 10 cm on the map correspond to 1 km in reality.
Cs: Conclusion: Reality Statement: The route from the crossroads Admiral St /
Baker St to the crossroads Cesar St / Dundas St via the crossroads Elvis St /
Fitzgerald St is 1 km long.
The descriptions in the Observation Premise Ps3 and in the Conclusion Cs are still laborious. If
the arguer has the map in front of herself and her addressee, she will say instead: Pss3: ‘We are
here’, thereby pointing to a point in the map, continue with: ‘The pub is there’, thereby pointing
to another point on the map, and then go on with: ‘This route …’, thereby following with her
finger the respective lines on the map from the starting point to the destination, ‘… is 10 cm
long’. And the conclusion may be reduced to: Css: ‘This means this route / route 1 / the route via
the crossroads Elvis St / Fitzgerald St is 1 km long.’ I repeat, this possibility is given only if the
map is present. As Dove (2016) rightly says, this indexical way of referring to the objects the
argument is about does not change the substance of the inference (p. 5). But it moves us still
further away from the ideal version, which makes the inferential relation fully transparent.
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The exemplary argument reconstructed so far is only one elementary argument within the
complex argument sketched by Dove about what is the quickest route to the pub. Other parts of
the complex argument which are again appeals to visual models regard the number of crossroads
to be crossed and the situation of pedestrian bridges. To proceed with the argument, further
empirical information is needed, which cannot be read off the map but may be part of the
common knowledge of the persons involved, namely walking speed and the (medium) time to be
spent for crossing the various crossroads. The speed information together with the lenghts of the
routes permits us to calculate the net walking times; adding the waiting times for the crossroads
without pedestrian bridges finally leads to the gross walking times. The final piece of the
argument is to establish the route with the shortest gross walking time. All these further parts,
i.e., further elementary arguments, within the complex argument are analytically valid, hence
deductively valid, if the empirical premisses and lemmata are supplemented by analytically true
premisses. This means even the complex argument (if supplemented by the analytically true
premisses) is deductive. For making it an argumentatively valid argument (which implies among
others also soundness), of course, now the empirical premisses have to be true, and the fitting
premisses have to be filled in (as required by the argument’s structure, to make the inferences in
fact deductively valid).
That the basic structure of the appeal to visual model is deductive may be surprising. But
it is good news since this fact reduces this type of argument to one subform of a well-studied
general class of arguments, for which the epistemological basis is clear, namely deductive logic
with its transfer of the truth-value ‘true’ from the premisses to the conclusion. (The just stated
deductive character of appeals to visual models presupposes that the premisses are not restricted
by qualifiers. Such a restriction, however, may sometimes be necessary, in particular if the model
is not precise or contains errors. In such a case the isomorphy premise could be weakened to a
statistical proposition, saying that the relation of isomorophy holds only extensively, e.g., only
for 99% of the representations, but not always. In this case the argument has to be transformed
into a probabilistic argument with a probabilistic conclusion. But for probabilistic arguments we
have epistemological analyses as well, which justify these arguments with the help of probability
theory (cf. Lumer, 2011).) Having arrived at this point, no further epistemological analysis of the
appeal to visual model is required. Hence we can now compare the epistemological analysis of
the appeal to visual model with Dove’s respective theory.
3. Comparing Dove’s theory of appeals to visual models and the epistemological analysis
Dove’s (2016) final argument scheme is:
Dove’s “Appeal to Visual Model:
[PD1:] Representation Relation: R models O.
[PD2:] Reasoning On Model: In R, r obtains.
[CD:] Conclusion: In O, o obtains (where o is the feature represented by r in R).”
(p. 6; insertions in square brackets by me, C.L.)
The proper scheme is complemented by the following critical questions:
CQ1: “Is the representation / model adequate for the given reasoning?”
CQ2: “Does the representation / model accurately portray the relevant relations?”
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CQ3: “Is the result, r on R, properly attributed?”
CQ4: “Are there competing representations / models of O?” (Dove, 2016, p. 7)
Though Dove’s schematization of the appeal to visual models is an important step and
progress I think it is still lacking in several respects.
1. What bothers me most is that his scheme does not represent a deductively or
analytically valid inference, though, as has just been shown, appeals to visual models can be
analyzed and reduced to deductive arguments. Without such a kind of reduction or an alternative
foundation, which Dove however does not provide, the arguments and the argument scheme
remain unjustified and their merits unclear. Why should we trust such an argument, i.e. believe
the conclusion, if the premisses are fulfilled? Instead of providing such a justificatory reduction,
Dove complements the scheme by the critical questions. But as in Walton’s approach, these
critical questions cannot substitute an epistemological justification of the scheme (see below).
(By the way, Walton developed his argumentation schemes approach with the critical questions
for resolving the problem of uncertain arguments. If, however, appeals to visual models can be
analyzed as deductive and therefore certain arguments, bringing in the argumentation schemes
approach with the critical questions should be superfluous even in Walton’s terms. And it does
not resolve the justification problem anyway.)
2. One could try to move on from Dove’s scheme to a deductively (or at least
analytically) valid scheme by transforming the parenthesis in his conclusion CD into an
additional premise: PD3: ‘r in R represents o in O.’ However, this would not yet suffice. First,
the premise PD1 on the Representation Relation, that “R models O” is quite unclear. It should be
analyzed and made precise in a way that also entails taking up the notion ‘x represents y’, now
mentioned in PD3, and that, in the end, can make the argument deductively valid. This could be
done by appealing to the isomorphy relation – as has been done in my epistemological analysis.
Second, still a further premise, viz. on the model affiliation of what has been observed and is
now described in premise PD2, would be missing. Third, the described model feature “r” usually
is a state of affairs, i.e., an n-adic relation between objects. The bijective mapping of the
isomorphy relation between reality and the model, however, is not primarily defined for states of
affairs but for objects and relations, such that the counterpart of the state of affairs in the model
has to be composed by relying on these more elementary mappings (cf. the premisses Pi4 on
Object Correspondences and Pi5 on the Relation Correspondence in my own account).
3. A minor problem is that in Dove’s descriptions the meaning of “r” is not entirely clear.
In the analyzed examples r sometimes is a mere observational statement—like “white line” in an
x-ray (Dove, 2016, p. 5); on other occasions it seems to be already an interpretation—like: a
certain route on the map “appears quickest” (p. 5). If r is an observation statement it remains
unclear how the step from this observation to the realistic interpretation can be justified. If r is
instead an interpreation it is not clear how this interpretation itself is justified.
4. Dove explicitly refuses to analyze appeals to visual models with the help of the
isomorphy relation (Dove, 2016, p. 3). His reason for this refusal is: For most (non-scientific)
purposes the isomorphism requirement would be too strong; models represent only some features
of the original accurately (p. 3). Instead of the isomorphy relation he wants to rely on the
similarity relation (p. 3). Perhaps the reason for rejecting isomorphism as the basis of his
approach relies simply on a misunderstanding. Isomorphism does not imply that the original is
completely reproduced; exactly to the contrary, the extension of the isomorphism can precisely
be defined, such that e.g., houses or trees or park benches are excluded from the representation in
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a map. The similarity relation, on the other hand, is much too unclear and vague as to be apt to
provide the conceptual basis of a reconstruction of appeals to visual models which make their
rationale clear. And the similarity relation is an understatement of what a real model claims to
achieve. In refusing an analysis with the help of the isomorophy relation Dove exactly rejects
what would be the basis for a precise reconstruction of appeals to visual models. Furthermore,
often the model is not similar—at least in the everyday sense—to the represented reality: think
e.g., of representing time in a two dimensional space with the help of a time bar with insertions
of event descriptions, or a temperature curve over time, or the representation of atmospheric
pressure over time by a pressure curve, or its spatial distribution by a map with isobars, or the
representation of parental relations with the help of a genealogic tree.
5. Dove’s critical questions help to be attentive to certain critical points in appeals to
visual models. However, they do not clarify or guarantee the appeal’s validity; and for the
deductive reconstruction of the appeal they are superfluos. CQ1 asks for the model’s adequacy to
provide the required information. However, if the model is not adequate in this respect, the
desired conclusion cannot be derived; a fortiori, no argument has to be assessed. (Or if,
alternatively, the desired conclusion is inferred to nonetheless, either some premise is false or the
conclusion is not valid. Both cases are captured by traditional criteria for good deductive
arguments.) CQ2, whether the model accurately represents the relevant relations, is a question
for the truth of the premise PD1 on the Representation Relation (‘R models O’). Hence CQ2 and
the answer to it do not provide anything new beyond the original argument; the question is only
an invitation to carefully examine the premise. (One could interpret PD1 also differently, much
weaker, as saying only that R models O in some way without implying the correctness of the
model. In this case the answer to CQ2 would provide new information. But this information then
should be included among the premisses in the first place.) CQ3 is rather unclear to me. Finally,
CQ4, regarding competing models, is only a particular way to ask for the premisses’ truth: If
there is a competing model which, in addition, is also correct then the used model is not correct.
And this means premise PD1 (on the representational relation) is false. Altogether, then, the
critical questions and the answers to them do not provide anything new beyond the original
argument—if this argument was valid and sound. Hence they do not provide something which
can justify reliance on the inconclusive argument scheme.
These criticisms show that though Dove’s theory of the appeal to visual model is an
important progress it can still be improved. And I hope to have shown that the approach
developed here is such an improvement since it does not have the problems just listed. However,
my approach dismisses the Waltonian framework of argumentation schemes. Instead it is
epistemological, i.e., it tries to provide a firm epistemological basis for the schematized type of
argument ‘appeal to visual model’, which in this case is deductive logic.
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